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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The Role of Lead System Integrator 
Presenter: The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, is a Professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. He is also the Director of both the 
Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology Industry Center. As the third-
ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Gansler was responsible for all research and 
development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, environmental security, defense industry, 
and numerous other security programs.  
Before joining the Clinton Administration, Gansler held a variety of positions in government and the 
private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant Director 
of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics), Executive Vice President at TASC, Vice President of 
ITT, and engineering and management positions with Singer and Raytheon Corporations.  
Throughout his career, Gansler has written, published, and taught on subjects related to his work. He 
recently served as the Chair of the Secretary of the Army’s “Commission on Contracting and Program 
Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.”  He is also a member of the National Academy of 
Engineering and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Additionally, he is the Glenn 
L. Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering, an Affiliate Faculty 
member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, and a Senior Fellow at the James MacGregor Burns 
Academy of Leadership (all at the University of Maryland). For 2003–2004, he served as Interim Dean of 
the School of Public Policy. For 2004–2006, Gansler served as the Vice President for Research at the 
University of Maryland.  
Authors: 
William Lucyshyn is the Director of Research and Senior Research Scholar at the Center for Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.  In this position, 
he directs research on critical policy issues related to the increasingly complex problems associated with 
improving public sector management and operations, and how government works with private enterprise.   
Current projects include modernizing government supply chain management, identifying government 
sourcing and acquisition best practices, and Department of Defense business modernization and 
transformation.  Previously, Lucyshyn served as a program manager and the principal technical advisor to 
the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the identification, 
selection, research, development, and prototype production of advanced technology projects.   
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the US Air Force.  Lucyshyn 
received his Bachelor Degree in Engineering Science from the City University of New York, and he 
earned his Master’s Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.  He has 
authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles.   
Adam Spiers is a Graduate Research Assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in 
the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.  In this position, he researches and writes draft 
versions of final reports on selected defense acquisition topics.  He has coauthored “Using Spiral 
Development to Reduce Acquisition Cycle Times,” published in September 2008 by the Naval 
Postgraduate School.   
Spiers is currently pursuing a Master’s in Public Policy, expected graduation May 2009.  He graduated 
summa cum laude from the University of Maryland, College Park, with dual Bachelor of Arts degrees in 









The Department of Defense (DoD) (as well as other government agencies) has used a 
strategy of contracting with a Lead System Integrator (LSI) when pursuing large System-of-
System (SoS) acquisition programs.  A SoS acquisition program involves the purposeful 
integration of individual weapon systems, along with other task-oriented assets, yielding a sum 
greater than the constituent parts.  A SoS acquisition program will typically integrate legacy 
systems with new weapons platforms; in some cases, however, a SoS program will completely 
design and integrate a new set of systems.   
A SoS is most likely to attain its potential benefits if a sole entity is responsible for 
managing the process.  In order to properly manage the risks of a SoS development, a 
responsible agent is needed to coordinate and manage the complex effort, provide commonality 
across multiple weapons platforms and ensure a common vision for the program.  
Responsibilities can include systems engineering, architecture development, cost estimating, 
element selection, and SoS validation.  This function is known as SoS integration.  Believing 
that it did not have the organic managerial capability to oversee such monumental development 
tasks, the government has employed private contractors, which have come to be known as 
Lead System Integrators (LSIs), to manage the development of selected SoS programs.  Due to 
difficulties faced by the Coast Guard’s Deepwater SoS development, Congress prohibited the 
awarding of new LSI contracts, effective October 1, 2010, to firms that supply systems hardware 
for the SoS or perform an inherently governmental function (Congress, 2008).  Despite this 
prohibition, the SoS integration functions performed by LSIs remain critical if the government 
wishes to pursue SoS engineering programs.   
The impetus for SoS development has two foundations.  First, the military has adopted a 
new fighting doctrine known as Net-centric Warfare (NCW).  NCW attempts to leverage the 
advantage of information integration by distributed “sensors and shooters” to fight more 
effectively.  NCW is characterized by complete battlefield awareness, self-synchronization of 
forces, and the overwhelming and precise application of force.  This doctrine potentially reduces 
individual weapon system requirements but raises new issues such as communication system 
vulnerabilities.  Second, many military assets are approaching the end of their originally 
intended lifespan and require replacement.  This situation is a result of a lack of military 
development during the 1990s, combined with the increase in military requirements since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11/01.  
System-of-systems acquisition provides the crosslink between the DoD’s change of 
military doctrine and its need to modernize its current forces.  A SoS development provides the 
DoD with the unique ability to simultaneously field the full range of capabilities that it seeks in its 
next generation of military units.  The integrated nature of the SoS, centered around an 
extensive communications network, lays the groundwork for complete implementation of NCW.   
System-of-Systems Engineering (SoSE) offers the military two significant potential 
benefits.  First, SoSE enhances the value of the end product by purposely synthesizing the 
attributes of a group of units into something that is greater than the sum of the individual parts.  
Second, SoSE, by taking a holistic view of the project, has the potential to improve development 
                                                
1 Research conducted at the Center of Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s 
School of Public Policy. Research partially sponsored by a grant from the Naval Postgraduate School.  
The full report is available at www.acquisitionresearch.net . 
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decision-making by better valuing overall development tradeoffs.  In a SoS framework, the SoS 
development output is maximized, as opposed to individual assets.  In order to achieve optimal 
SoS performance within affordability constraints, SoSE requires development tradeoffs among 
the assets that comprise a given SoS.   
SoSE differs from traditional engineering in significant ways.  Traditional engineering 
seeks to optimize the performance of a single system, given specific end-requirements.  SoSE 
attempts to develop a certain overall mission capability.  SoS has two unique challenges not 
faced by traditional engineering.  First, a SoS has a theoretically infinite lifespan as elements 
come and go in the SoS as it evolves.  As long as the mission capability is supported, the SoS 
changes to continue to fulfill its role, even as the elements that constitute the SoS can be 
continuously replaced.  Second, a SoS has undefined requirements, within cost, schedule and 
technology constraints.  Without a specified end-point that encapsulates firm performance 
requirements, engineers have difficulty making explicit tradeoffs in functionality.  Traditional 
engineering practices are not adequate to develop a truly integrated SoS.   
DoD faces many challenges that may undermine effective SoS development.  DoD-wide 
challenges include greatly broadened military requirements in response to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11; impending budget constraints, stemming from the need to increase federal mandatory 
spending programs as the baby boom enters retirement; the inadequate capability and capacity 
of the current acquisition workforce to undertake SoS development programs due, in part, to 
human resource management decisions since the end of the Cold War; and the consolidation of 
the defense industry, which has significantly reduced competition and eliminated many 
independent systems engineering firms (primarily through acquisitions by the weapon systems 
producers).  SoS-specific challenges include: an inconsistent understanding of the term SoSE 
by the acquisition workforce (including the role of cost in systems engineering analyses); the 
lack of a codified approach to SoSE, a function of the newness of the process; the 
interconnected nature of SoS development—which, if not handled properly, could lead to 
systemic failure, as disaster in one portion can have deleterious ripple effects throughout the 
entire SoS; ensuring adequate adaptability, so the SoS is flexible enough to meet future needs 
but provides enough stability to be a base for future design; the scale of development that 
necessitates the simultaneous development of a large number of assets, each of which would 
have traditionally been viewed as a major acquisition program; and, finally, budget instability, 
which is a constant challenge to DoD programs but which SoS development is particularly 
susceptible to.  
The LSI, like a traditional prime contractor, must oversee technological maturity and 
subsystem development, as well as make decisions regarding tradeoffs within the context of the 
entire program.  LSIs, however, have been given broad, government-like authority to execute 
acquisition programs that includes development of individual system requirements, contracting 
for their development and procurement, and coordination of development schedules and efforts.  
The degree of authority and responsibility given to an LSI, however, depends upon the program 
in question.  Regardless of the authority the government delegates to the LSI, the government is 
still responsible for the program and must oversee the actions of the LSI and retain final 
decision authority.   
Although the government could potentially perform the SoS integration function, its 
acquisition workforce lacks the numbers of personnel with the required skills that this effort 
requires.  Consequently, the government chose to employ LSIs for its two largest SoS 
programs: the Coast Guard’s Deepwater and the Army’s Future Combat Systems.   
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Congress has defined two types of LSI contracts.  An LSI with SoS system responsibility 
is a prime contractor that is primarily responsible for developing or producing the SoS, but which 
will subcontract much of the actual work.  In this case, the LSI is responsible for the delivery of 
the completed, integrated system to the government.  An LSI without SoS system responsibility 
is a prime contractor that is delegated government-like authority to perform what are typically 
considered inherently governmental functions.  Although Congress has defined LSI in only two 
ways, the relationship that exists between the government and its chosen LSI can vary 
considerably, depending on how the contract is structured.  
A principal fear stemming from use of an LSI is that the entity infringes upon inherently 
governmental functions.  Critics warn that by awarding LSI contracts, the government avoids its 
primary responsibility without being able to provide adequate oversight of the LSI.  Ultimately, 
they argue, the LSI has a strong incentive to take actions beneficial to the firm at the expense of 
the government’s interests—e.g., regarding make/buy decisions on elements of the system and 
shaping the architecture around the firm’s products.  Proponents of LSI believe the fears of 
critics are either unfounded or can be addressed by proper government oversight. 
This report examines two case studies of LSIs, the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater 
System Project (Deepwater) and the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS), to illustrate the 
challenges and benefits of using LSI by the federal government.  Both programs have faced 
significant development challenges, especially in adapting to new requirements arising from 
post-9/11 legislation.   
The Integrated Deepwater System Program is the Coast Guard’s effort to completely 
modernize its entire service.  The program has faced many challenges, including an increase in 
required capabilities, acceleration of the program, and a natural disaster.  Deepwater has 
experienced significant cost increases and schedule slippages that have led to the cancellation 
of several components.  Due to these problems, the Coast Guard has taken over the role of LSI, 
although the Coast Guard still relies upon the original LSI for support of their program 
management.     
The Future Combat Systems, an Army brigade-modernization program, has also 
experienced cost growth and schedule problems.  In this instance, initial development problems 
were compounded by an acceleration of the delivery schedule and the need to deliver 
incremental improvements to soldiers in the field that were not previously planned.  Although the 
program has experienced some challenges, these are, in general, not attributable to the use of 
an LSI. 
These case studies have produced three key “lessons learned.”  First, although SoS 
integration is widely acknowledged as necessary to pursue SoS development, the presence of 
an LSI is not a cure-all.  The military, lawmakers and industry must limit development programs 
based upon immature technologies in order to avoid these development problems.  Second, 
while the government retained final authority rule over all important decisions, the Coast Guard 
and Army have been criticized for not exercising effective oversight of the LSI.  Third, as 
presented by the FCS case study, it is important for military and industry to establish key 
shared-interests early in the development process.  The benefit of establishing key shared-
interests should be built upon, however, consideration of resource constraints. 
The authors of the report arrived at the following findings: 
1. The military is committed to SoS development. 
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2. SoS engineering and integration is a complex undertaking. 
3. SoS development and integration is still a maturing discipline.   
4. Government does not currently have capability or capacity to perform SoSE.   
5. LSI programs have experienced technical difficulty for a variety of reasons.   
6. Despite retaining final decision authority, the government has not consistently provided 
effective oversight of private LSIs.   
7. The greatest concern regarding the use of LSI is the government’s delegation of 
“inherently governmental functions.”   
8. A potential conflict-of-interests exists for private LSIs.   
9. Unified leadership of the SoS integration affords the best chance of successful 
completion.   
The authors of this report arrived at several conclusions: 
1. The government should continue development of SoS programs that, if developed 
correctly, offer the potential for better value—more capability at equal or lower cost—to 
the military, than do individual procurements.  
2. The government must effectively partner with the private sector to adequately perform 
the LSI function. To perform its responsibilities adequately:  
a. The DoD must provide better oversight and write contracts that are better 
defined. 
b. The DoD should accelerate its efforts to recruit, hire, and retain the required 
human capital required for program oversight (and, when required, program 
management) for the challenging SoS acquisitions.    
c. The government should enforce hardware and software exclusion provisions for 
system-of-system integration contracts.   
3. Congress should modify the prohibition on the use of LSIs to permit either: (1) small-
scale limited programs for LSIs or (2) large-scale programs for LSIs that are willing to 
take hardware and software exclusions.  These pilot programs will help the DoD 
examine and evaluate strategies to fully leverage private-sector capacity while 
ensuring adequate government oversight and avoiding conflict-of-interest concerns. 
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